Quoting from Slashdot:
An anonymous reader writes “In the latest posting on the Xen developer list, IBM pledges to make Xen more secure by porting its secure hypervisor (sHype) architecture to it. In their posting, IBM discusses an SELinux like access control frame work, resource control and monitoring and trusted computing support for Xen. It appears that a lot is happening on the Xen front (for example, the announcement of XenSource Inc. and Intel’s code drop in the xeno-unstable.bk tree for their super secret VT CPU).”
Here the post:
From: Reiner Sailer
sHype Hypervisor Security Architecture for Xen
I am a member of the Secure Systems Department at IBM”s TJ Watson Research Center (http://www.research.ibm.com/secure_systems_department/).
Our group has designed and developed a security architecture for hypervisors (called sHype). We have implemented it on an x86-based IBM research hypervisor. We now plan to contribute this to Xen by integrating our security architecture into it.
sHype is based on mandatory access controls (MAC). This allows Xen to use access rules (formal policy) to control both the sharing of virtual resources as well as the information flow between domains. The Xen port of sHype will leverage the existing Xen interdomain communication mechanism and we expect near-zero performance overhead on the performance-critical paths (e.g., sending or receiving packets on a virtual network, or writing or reading shared memory). The sHype access control architecture separates policy decisions from policy enforcement. It is modeled after the Flask security architecture as implemented in SELinux (http://www.cs.utah.edu/flux/fluke/html/flask.html). Our design is targeted at a flexible medium-assurance architecture that can support anything from simple security domains to multilevel security (MLS) and Chinese Wall policies.
Merging the sHype access control architecture with Xen is the first step toward our goal of hardening Xen to support enterprise-class applications and security requirements. We are working on the following items to achieve this goal (which we intend to contribute spread out over this year):
* Port sHype to Xen
* Add stronger security/isolation guarantees (confinement) to what is currently available through Xen”s (and other hypervisors”) address space separation mechanisms, e.g., to enable information flow Control in Xen
* Enhance Xen to support trusted computing under Linux using TCG/TPM-based attestation mechanisms
* Enhance Xen to support secure resource metering, verification, and control.
* Apply our experience in automated security analysis to Xen to make it more robust
* Make Xen suitable for Common Criteria evaluation
We are confident that our work will significantly contribute to Xen in the security space and that it is a good fit with the Xen roadmap. We look forward to interacting with the Xen community on the design and implementation of our architecture.
Reiner Sailer, Research Staff Member, Secure Systems Department
IBM T J Watson Research Ctr, 19 Skyline Drive, Hawthorne NY 10532
Phone: 914 784 6280 (t/l 863) Fax: 914 784 6205, firstname.lastname@example.org